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  By setting bounds on money growth, the commodity standard is a solution 
to the monetary authority’s time inconsistency problem, which arises from the 
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evidence are taken from England’s experience of the suspension of cash 
payments between 1797 and 1821. 
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The world￿ s ￿rst successful paper money regime, an era of inconvertible pound, began on
27 February 1797, when the Bank of England ceased to convert its deposit notes to gold
specie in order to prevent a complete drain on its gold reserves. Initially the suspension
of cash payments ￿the Suspension Period or the Bank Restriction Period as it became
known ￿was intended as an emergency measure to ease panic following rumours of
French invasion. The public expected the suspension to continue only for a period of
three weeks, or at most, until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but it was, in fact, to
last until 1 May 1821. When the war ￿nally ended in 1815, the circulation of paper
currency was so high and exchange rates unfavourable that resumption would only be
possible after a period of adjustment. According to the conventional view the Bank
exploited the absence of the su¢ cient gold backing restriction: as a private enterprise
it increased its pro￿ts through discount business; and, as an agency for government
￿nance it maximised seigniorage revenue.
The main contribution of this paper is to suggest an alternative interpretation of the
Suspension Period. The suspension of cash payments did not only protect the Bank￿ s
gold reserves, it maintained paper money in circulation. By representing a credible
commitment to return to the gold standard, the suspension of cash payments supported
the value of inconvertible paper currency. Money was valued because people believed
the resumption to be likely in the future. Furthermore, paper money was accepted by
the government for tax payments and by merchants in domestic trade. If the Bank had
allowed gold conversion to continue, the circulating money stock would have reduced
at the same rate as monetary gold. As converted gold was put into hoards, money
available for consumption purchases would have reduced. Therefore, the suspension of
cash payments stabilised consumption, domestic production and asset prices during a
long, exhausting war.
Narrative histography has not recognised the importance of circulation in stabilising
consumption and production, but contemporaries, such as the banker and Member of
Parliament Henry Thornton, understood:
2the necessity of maintaining the accustomed, or nearly accustomed,
quantity of its (Bank of England￿ s) notes, however great may be the ￿ uctu-
ation of its cash1.
As the survival of the country was at stake, the Bank had to provide some accommo-
dation and support the government￿ s urgent war e⁄orts by buying its short term paper.
The long term interest rate, however, remained remarkably low and stable over the Sus-
pension Period which, from the viewpoint of the conventional opinion on seigniorage,
seems anomalous. The Directors of the Bank understood that ￿ the formidable weapon
of unrestricted money creation￿ 2 had not been placed in their hands and the Bank did
not use in￿ ationary monetary policy extensively. The government met its long term
￿nancial needs through income tax and public borrowing.
The commodity standard, which had been the prevailing monetary regime in Eng-
land from medieval times until the suspension, enforced a convertibility rule. Under
this rule the monetary authority ￿the mint or the central bank ￿had to be prepared
to maintain the value of the currency in terms of a ￿xed weight of gold and to buy and
sell gold at a ￿xed price on demand. As it seemed that paper money had to be convert-
ible into bullion for it to be accepted, the willingness of the public to use inconvertible
money during the Suspension Period appears peculiar. Those who wished to convert
their money had to wait for a long time: although the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815,
the suspension of cash payments continued for six additional years. Could the Bank￿ s
refusal to resume the payments immediately after the war be seen as evidence of dis-
cretionary policy-making? In this paper I suggest that as the e⁄ects of the initial shock
were long lasting, these additional years played an important role in the credible return
to convertibility. During these years the Bank, with the support of the Parliament,
reduced issue and regulated public and private loans to ensure controlled adjustment
of prices and exchange rate to the gold standard.
The motivation for this research comes from the historical evidence. Section two
1Thornton (1802) p 67. "Cash" in context of gold standard refers to specie.
2Expression is from AndrØadŁs (1909) p. 191 who, on the contrary, argues that the Bank did in￿ ate
the currency.
3explains why the era of Pre-classical Gold Standard (1717-1797) cannot be analysed
using the standard framework of the Classical Gold Standard. Then I discuss how my
perspective on the Suspension Period builds on the well accepted theory of the gold
standard as a contingent rule. The third section explains why economic conditions were
stable between 1717 and 1790, what disturbed this stability in the 1790s and how the
suspension of cash payments was used to restore stability.
The historical evidence raises the question of why the gold standard and its successor
were so successful. In the fourth and ￿fth section I analyse this question through the
lens of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which suggests that the agents
must have regarded commitment to monetary stability as highly likely. Furthermore,
I ask what gave the gold standard this credibility. As I am not interested in modeling
gold production or hypothetical parameters such as target levels for private gold stock,
I omit the commonly used static set up of Barro (1979) and build a new model of a
commodity standard.
The results in section four reveal how the gold standard solves the discretionary
problem which arises from the ￿xed wage structure. Under the gold standard the money
growth rate cannot be regulated by governmental policy because the money stock can
increase or decrease only if the commodity stock in monetary use increases or decreases
respectively. I conclude this section by demonstrating that the ￿nite gold endowment
sets bounds on the money growth rate. As a result the price level, consumption and
asset price ￿ uctuations are also bounded.
The feasibility of any commodity standard relies on the availability of the backing
commodity for monetary use. I start the section ￿ve by analysing the di¢ culties which
arise if the commodity ￿ ow stops for some exogenous reason but the country still follows
the convertibility rule. The economy would perform better in terms of stability and
economic activity, if during the stoppage the government would cease the convertibility
of the backing commodity and issue ￿at money knowing that in the future, when the
commodity is again available, the old standard will be restored. In section six I illustrate
the results with calculations and in section seven I summarise conclusions and discuss
the implications of results.
42 Reconsidering the Suspension Period
The question of how alterations to the commodity standard regime, such as the suspen-
sion of the convertibility rule, have been used to stabilise the economy, has not hitherto
been analysed. Although for centuries the commodity standard dominated academic
and political discussion in economic science, these studies primarily stressed imperson-
ality and the automatic operations of the gold standard or examined the advantages
and disadvantages between di⁄erent commodity systems.
Most of the research on the commodity standard to date has been carried out
under the assumption that conversion is assured now and in the future. Since its
publication, Barro (1979) has been the foundation for a number of models on the
commodity standard. Apart from a brief discussion, he sidesteps any possible change
in the monetary structure. The results of models of this type, for example Goodfriend
(1988), McCallum (1996), are probably oversimpli￿ed to some extent, as in these models
the money stock and price level determination is separated from governmental policy
and the results apply only to the relatively short era of the Classical Gold Standard,
1880-1914.
The recent development in the theory of macroeconomics, namely the discretionary
and time inconsistency arguments of Kydland and Presscott (1977), and the vast liter-
ature that it precipitated, have not yet been fully applied to the commodity standard
framework. During the time of absolutist monarchs the commodity standard was an
external constraint which restricted policy decisions.3 Convertibility was a transpar-
ent principle that made the government and central bank￿ s policies observable. Public
could test the maintenance of the rule by comparing the mint price of gold to its mar-
ket price4. If the market price were above the mint price, that was an indication of
mismanagement and resulted in gold ￿ owing from the central bank and often from the
country.
Bordo and Kydland (1995) evaluate how the gold standard has restricted the conduct
of monetary policy in various countries. They argue that the gold standard had a dual
3Blackburn and Christensen (1989) p. 3.
4Flandreau (2006).
5role: it binded monetary policy over time by limiting the ability of current and future
policy makers to conduct discretionary monetary policy, but during a war or other
emergency the government could challenge the rule by temporarily suspending the
commodity standard on the understanding that the convertibility would be restored at
the original parity after the emergency had passed. The authors call the gold standard
a contingent rule. Countries committed to the gold standard rule with a war or other
di¢ cult time as a contingency. Market agents would regard successful adherence as
evidence of a credible commitment and would allow the authorities access to seigniorage
and bond ￿nance at favourable terms.5 Since the monetary rule had a contingent nature
Bordo and Kydland (1995), Bordo and Schwartz (1977) and Rolnick and Weber (1998)
consider the temporary paper money standards, which for example in England occurred
from 1797-1821 and from 1914-1925, as a parenthesis in the context of the gold standard.
Bordo and Redish (1993) argue that during the absence of the gold backing, govern-
ments chose the rate of ￿at money issue to maximise the present value of seigniorage
revenue. The rule according to which the resumption must occur in old par value set
a terminal condition and restricted the supply of money. In Bordo and Redish (1993)
the suspension is of known duration and the terminal condition implies that the money
issuer must start by reducing nominal balances below the level implied by the gold
standard.
This paper stems from the literature on the time consistency and developes Bordo
and Kydland￿ s (1995) theory of the gold standard as a rule and Bordo and Redish (1993)
argument about seignorage ￿nance in the context of the Pre-classical Gold Standard
of 1717-1797 and the Suspension Period of 1797-1821. The key insight of this paper
is that it identi￿es the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments as di⁄erent
monetary regimes simply because the monetary rules these regimes enforced were not
identical. The gold standard regime implemented the convertibility rule. The monetary
base was ￿xed and as the other main trade partners of England were on silver or
bimetallic standard, the exchange rate was ￿xed in terms of ￿xed ratio between silver
and gold. The monetary rule under the Suspension Period was to convert circulating
5Bordo and Kydland (1995) p. 424.
6paper currency to gold at some future point. The monetary base was ￿ exible, not tied
to gold reserves, and the ratio in the price of silver and gold ￿ uctuated. The Bank of
England￿ s operating procedures were di⁄erent during the gold standard and suspension
of cash payments.
The Suspension Period lasted for almost a quarter of the century ￿hardly a ￿ tem-
porary￿period as claimed by Bordo and Kydland (1995) ￿covering the Napoleonic
wars over which the doctrines of the gold standard would not have reached. As Du⁄y
(1982) argues, the war years were not just di¢ cult times, but a period of constant
shocks during which the Bank of England had to face problems such as bad harvests,
trade blockades and high government expenditure, which in peace time arose only oc-
casionally. The end date of suspension was unknown and resumption plans unspeci￿c:
Parliament authorised the resumption to be moved forwards ten times by the Acts that
were given between 1797 and 1823. They were carefully worded and declared, for ex-
ample, that resumption was not possible until ￿ One Month after the conclusion of the
present War by a De￿nite Treaty of Peace￿ 6.
The historical evidence does not support the argument that during the Suspension
Period of 1797-1821 the objective of the government would have been to maximise
seigniorage revenue. The gold standard rule itself is not immune from seigniorage
￿nance or ￿duciary note issue: monetary authorities can reduce gold content of specie
or issue non-backed paper money without any monetary regime modi￿cations. For the
government the ability to borrow both at home and abroad was crucial during the
time of war. If the government￿ s objective was to maximise seigniorage it would have
decreased expected return on government bonds and made the public debt harder to sell.
In￿ ation would have increased domestic prices, encouraged imports and made exchange
rates unfavorable. This would have depressed domestic production and challenged the
return to the gold standard alltogether.
According to Bordo and Redish (1993) the very reason for the successful survival of
the gold standard during the turmoil of the nineteenth century was that it permitted
the suspension of convertibility. The gold standard as a contingent rule theory suggests,
6Geo. III,c. 3, 9th November 1797.
7however, that the suspension was a carefully planned policy action during wartime. The
source of the contingency in 1797 was not a war, but availability of gold in monetary use:
the historical analysis shows how in the eighteenth century England did not abandon
the gold convertibility rule during every war, but only in 1797 when the maintenance
of convertibility became impossible.
3 Monetary Policy under the Gold Standard and
the Suspension of Cash Payments 1797-1821
The monetary policy and institutions of the eighteenth century were an outcome of
an evolutionary process rather than social planning of any kind. Fetter states in the
beginning of his seminal book Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797-1875
(1965) that ￿ in 1797 there was in England no generally accepted theory of a monetary
and banking system￿ . Existing institutions and laws, he writes, ￿ were inadequate and
in some cases inconsistent￿ .7 For example, England went in to the gold standard by
accident in 1717, when the master of the Royal Mint, Sir Isaac Newton, ￿xed the parity
between gold and silver such that silver was slightly over valued relative to gold. The
more valuable silver coins disappeared from circulation and gold became the prevailing
monetary standard.
Despite these inconsistencies and constant wars, the eighteenth century was an era
of economic growth, expansion of the banking system, and marked the start of the
Industrial Revolution. Much of the ￿nancial stability has caused by the comparatively
peaceful development of parliamentary government which started already in the sev-
enteenth century. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 initiated the era of parliamentary
supremacy. The Financial Revolution that followed secured private property rights,
the right of the Parliament to monitor the executive and the monarch and gradually
transferred the personal royal debt into a public debt controlled by the Parliament.8
In 1694 the establishment of the Bank of England as a private joint-stock bank that
7Fetter (1965) p. 1.
8Dickson (1967) p. 12 and North and Weingast (1989).
8supported public ￿nance was a part of the Financial Revolution.
The French economic historian Peter Vilar (1969) argues that the stable system
of gold import and minting played a crucial part in creating monetary stability in
England, which lasted until the end of the eighteenth century. As Britain did not
have any gold mines of its own, the domestic demand for new gold had to be satis￿ed
by import.9 Early in the eighteenth century new gold mines were found in Brazil,
which between 1721 and 1780 produced 56 percent of the world￿ s gold10. The ￿rst
bene￿ciary of the sudden increase in Brazilian gold production and gold imports into
Europe was its colonial master Portugal, but it was not able to keep possession of the
metal. The Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic and military alliance during the Wars of the
Spanish Succession (1701-1714), and some small scale economic complementaries, such
as privilege in wine import, gave Britain a great advantage in the Portuguese gold
trade11. In the commercial triangle of Brazil, Britain and Portugal, the balance was
always in Britain￿ s favour and virtually free competition for British goods in Portugal
and its colonies drained gold away from them.12
From 1717 to 1797 the ￿xed monetary or mint price of gold had been at £3. 17s.
101
2d an ounce. Strict laws prohibited the export of English bullion, melted English
specie or gold from England, but export of foreign gold was permitted. As can be seen
in Figure 1 the market price of gold prior to the Suspension Period had rarely risen
above the parity price and even then only by a relatively small percentage. England￿ s
principal foreign exchange operations were with Hamburg, which was on silver standard
and the ￿ uctuations in the London-Hamburg rate were linked to changes in the gold-
silver ratio in Hamburg. According to Fetter the price changes were so small that the
prices of gold and silver in London and Hamburg were generally used interchangeably.
The stock of foreign coin and bullion in England was large and worked as a bu⁄er in
the case there was a temporary fall in the exchange rate and hence reduced the pressure
9Vilar (1976) p. 231.
10Schmitz (1979).
11Vilar (1976) p. 225 argues that Portugal become ￿ if not totally dependent on England politically,
at least strongly in￿ uenced by her economically, almost to exclusion of other powers￿ .
12Vilar (1976) p. 227.
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Figure 1: Monetary price of gold and market price of gold in London between 1717 and
1825, annually, measured in pennies. Lawrence H. O¢ cer, MeasuringWorth.com, 2006.
As the gold supply conditions were stable, the Bank of England was able to support
the monetary system with a relatively low gold backing rate. Figure 2 shows how,
apart from an exception in 1740, the value of bullion was always below the depository
notes. The Bank itself was an active gold dealer and bought gold directly from the
ships to meet immediate gold demand. As the Bank had to exchange gold for its notes,
buying gold did not increase the gold backing rate signi￿cantly but helped to satisfy
the gold demand in the short run. The bullion reserves of the Bank fell especially
during the wars when the expenditure of the government increased. The Bank was
able to adjust the demand of the private sector by using unconventional measures to
slow down the out￿ ow, such as paying demand for cash in shillings and sixpences. The
process of counting the small gold coin caused considerable delay, and time was thereby
13Fetter (1965) pp. 27-28.
10gained during the worst periods of the crises.14 The adjustment mechanism could not,
however, stop the drain of specie, which was caused by the government who made
foreign payments in gold, especially during the time of war.
Specie and depository notes of the Bank of England by themselves were inadequate
to meet the merchant and industry￿ s growing demand for credit. Already by the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century the paper form of money exceeded metallic money
in England and Wales, as the London money market and the provincial country banks
created more than half of the total money supply. The growth of the country banks, es-
pecially after 1750, increased regional money supply. The most common form of paper
money was the private banker￿ s promissory note to his client, payable either by demand
or after a certain date.15 Country banks did not have reserve requirements and at that
time the instability of English banks was belived to be explained by their freedom to
issue small notes, not to their under-capitalisation or lack of reserves.16
Since middle ages merchants had used various short term credit instruments, bills
of exchange, which themselves became like money if drawn on a trustworthy party.
Both the private bills and public credit instruments such as tallies and exchequer bills
could be converted to ready cash by discounting them at the Bank of England. The
growing number of the London private banks and country banks were successfully able
to compete with the Bank, which, by the end of the century, only discounted the bills of
the London merchants and private banks.17 Compared with total volume of the private
banks￿discounts, the Bank of England￿ s discounting business remained relatively small
until the end of century, but it was, nevertheless, a primary way for the Bank to put
its notes into circulation.18
The discount business gave the Bank income to pay its dividends and ready cash
for businessmen, but it also meant that the Bank held assets in stock which had not
reached their redemption date. Parliament enacted measures to control lending to the
14Acres (1931) p. 180.
15Pressnell (1956) p. 299.
16Dowd (1989) p. 118.
17King (1936) p. 12.































Figure 2: The Circulation of the Bank of England Notes and Bullion Reserves, annually
1720-1797. Clapham (1944) , Appendix C, pp. 295-296.
government, but commercial discounts were under the control of the Bank of England.
The usury laws, however, stood in the way of truly e⁄ective credit control. The
discounts were subject to the legal prohibition of interests above ￿ve percent, even
though the real market rate would have been higher. Only the rate on government
consols and East India Bonds were not subject to the usury laws. The demand of the
discounts speci￿cally at the Bank of England was tightly linked to the market interest
rates. If it increased above ￿ve percent, the discount business became unpro￿table for
lenders. The brokers of private lenders evaded the usury law widely, for example, by
charging higher commission or refusing to lend money to those who did not keep high
balances on their current accounts. Hence the Bank￿ s discounts became relatively cheap
when the market rate of interest rose above ￿ve percent.19
Towards the end of the century the gold demand remained unusually high for long
periods of time: Firstly, the market price of the gold rose above the mint price and
therefore, it was now possible to make arbitrage pro￿ts by buying gold from the Bank
19Du⁄y (1982) p. 67.
12and smuggling it abroad. Secondly, the outbreak of war with France in February 1793
demanded large foreign expenditures and at the end of 1794 the Prime Minister Pitt
made heavy calls upon the Bank to support his allies in Continental Europe by con-
siderable sums of specie ￿all drawn from the vaults of the Bank. The Directors of the
Bank became increasingly worried that lending huge sums of money to the government
would clash with the Bank￿ s original charter that forbade it to lend to the government
without the permission of Parliament. Thirdly, the country banks began to strengthen
their own gold holdings by cashing the Bank of England notes which they had kept as
a reserve. Simultaneously there were serious gold supply shocks. The Brazilian mines
started to dry up and the market price of the Brazilian gold increased. The war caused
disturbances at sea, increased insurance costs of shipping, and the market price of gold
increased even further.
In￿ uenced by a rumour of a French invasion farmers in Newcastle changed the notes
they received on selling their cattle to specie at their local bank on 18 February 1797.
A few days later the Newcastle banks suspended payments and this was followed by
bank runs in the nearby towns of Sunderland and Durham.20 The alarm was raised in
London and the demand for Bank of England notes was high, as they were convertible
on demand. The Bank￿ s Committee of Treasury reported on 22 February 1797, that
the gold reserves of the Bank had fallen by £622,000 since 1 January and were by the
end of February £1,086,170.
On Sunday 26 February, the following announcement, which came to mark the start
of the Suspension Period, was given after an emergency meeting between the King, Pitt
and Privy Council of the Bank:
The Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash in payment un-
til the sense of Parliament can be taken on that subject and the proper
measures adopted thereupon for maintaining the means of circulation and
supporting the public and commercial credit of the kingdom at this impor-
tant conjuncture.21
20Fetter (1965) p. 21.
21As quoted in Cannan (1925) p. xi.
13Close reading of the declaration reveals how members seemed to be as concerned
about the state of circulation as the bullion level of the Bank. For contemporaries the
low level of bullion and the low level of money circulation and credit caused di⁄erent
sets of problems, at least in the short run.
On the one hand, the gold reserves facilitated convertibility which, in turn, main-
tained the value of the money. As can be seen from the Figure 2 the bullion levels
of the Bank had been even lower earlier in the century, without causing such alarm.
The Bank was more concerned about maintaining its ability to support the value of the
currency through convertibility, not about the absolute size of its reserves. The value
of the gold reserves was considered con￿dential business information which was not
communicated clearly even to Pitt.22 This raises speculation as to whether the Bank
notes would have fell on discount and bank runs been more frequent than they actually
were in the eighteenth century if the Bank had been more transparent. The system
worked until the February 1797 when the pressure on the Bank￿ s reserves became too
high.
On the other hand, according to Henry Thornton the distress arising in London, ￿ was
a distress for notes of the Bank of England￿ .23 In London, the commercial and ￿nancial
centre of the country, the Bank of England notes where by far the most important
medium of exchange, and the whole credit system, ￿ payments which are most of them
promised beforehand￿ ,24 had been built on them. Thornton estimates that:
A diminution, for instance, of one-third or two-￿fths, might, perhaps,
be su¢ cient to produce a very general insolvency in London, of which the
e⁄ect would be the suspension of con￿dence, the derangement of commerce
and the stagnation of manufactures throughout the country.25
For a few days before the suspension the demand for the Bank of England notes
was so high that interest paid on them increased to 16 or 17 percent.26 As the people
22Fetter (1965) p 61.
23Thornton (1802) p. 113.
24Thornton (1802) p. 113.
25Thornton (1802) p. 114.
26Thornton (1802) p. 113.
14now held the Bank of England notes for gold conversion, the circulating medium used
in commerce and other purchases reduced. Neither were there any real alternatives
to the Bank of England notes, as no country bank or private bank notes circulated in
London. Converted gold did not return to circulation as it was either smuggled from the
country or put away in hoards. Sir Francis Baring, London merchant banker, in 1797
had recognised that the Bank notes were not just a substitute for money, but the basis
of the monetary system.27 Merchants in London were not interested in specie: ￿ The
quineas applied for by persons in London, was, generally speaking, account of people
in the country￿ , Thornton explains.28 The specie used in small domestic transactions
was often badly clipped or copper token coins.
The fact that the suspension of cash payments was not only a crisis of gold reserves,
but also a crisis in the circulation of the Bank of England notes, has been missed in much
of the debates on the Suspension Period ￿apart from those written by contemporaries
￿probably because the authors have been in￿ uenced by the doctrines of the Classical
Gold Standard. Fundamental doctrines of the Classical Gold Standard, such as narrow
gold reserve ratio policy and automatic price adjustment mechanism, did not, however,
apply into the gold standard in the eighteenth century.
While the order of the Privy Council was being published on the following Monday,
28 February 1797, the merchants and bankers of London had their own meeting. Its
outcome was a declaration where they assured that:
they would not refuse to receive Bank notes in payment of any sum of
money to be paid to them, and would use their utmost endeavours to make
all their payments in the same manner.29
The declaration was then published in the press bearing the signatures of many
hundreds of leading business houses. The Directors of the Bank also published a notice
assuring both the public and its proprietors that ￿ the Bank was in most sound condi-
tion￿ .30 The merchants, bankers and the Directors of the Bank of England undeniably
27Fetter (1965) p. 59.
28Thornton (1802) pp. 112-113.
29Feavearyear (1963) p. 183.
30Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 272. Feavearyear (1963) p. 183.
15had common interests. If the number of the Bank of England notes would had fallen too
far, there would have been delays in payments and other obligations which would have
brought down many large London houses and with them, the country banks, which in
turn had close links with the local industries.
A few days after the suspension the Parliament authorised the Bank to issue previ-
ously prohibited notes of a face value less than £5 to help with the shortage of circulating
medium. After the gold and silver coins had disappeared to hoards, there was no legal
tender currency in circulation. Those people, who had used only coin in the past, were
now introduced to the inconvertible paper money.31 In many regions the Bank of Eng-
land notes started to circulate alongside the country bank notes for the ￿rst time. The
authorities con￿rmed the status of the Bank of England notes as de facto legal tender
currency by legislation. The Bank Restriction Act passed on May 3 ensured the public
that:
all Sums of Money, which now are or shall become payable for any Part
of the Public revenue shall be accepted by the Collectors, Receivers and
other O¢ cers at the Revenue, authorised to receive the same, in Notes of
the said Governor and Company, expressed to be payable on Demand, if
o⁄ered to be to paid.32
The Bank was careful not to call the Bank of England notes legal tender currency,
probably because it could have become associated in the public mind with the failed
assignants in France33 or given the impression that the monetary base had shifted
permanently.
As such the transition between the monetary regimes was e⁄ected with little dis-
turbance. The con￿dence towards the payment system in London and provinces was
restored. Specie started to circulate alongside inconvertible paper currency and as can
be seen from Figure 4, the gold reserves of the Bank increased from the lowest point of
£982,000 in March 1797 to over £4,000,000 in August 1797, and continued to grow for
31Clapham (1944) Vol. II p. 3.
32Act 37 Geo.III. c.45.
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Figure 3: The Long Term Interest Rate. Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz (1953) p. 1444.
the next year and half. The exchanges with Hamburg, in Figure 5, improved almost
immediately and ￿ uctuations in the exchange rate and price of gold were hardly di⁄er-
ent from those under convertibility. The long term interest rate peaked in May 1798, as
can be seen in Figure 3, but reduced to the pre-suspension level by 1799. In Parliament
there were serious debates about the resumption of the gold standard in 1799, and the
Bank had expressed its readiness on more than one occasion to resume the payments
immediately.34 The government, however, wanted Parliament to extend the Restriction
Act in June and November 1797, and three times between 1802-180335 until in April
1803 a new war put an end to the discussions about the early resumption.
During the ￿rst ten years of the Bank Restriction Period, the Bank conducted
a rather restricted credit policy. Economic activity was low and the Bank￿ s private
discounts increased, indicating the Bank￿ s desire to maintain con￿dence immediately
34Feavearyear (1963) p. 190. Clapham (1944), Vol I, p. 272.
35Act 37, Geo. III, c.45, 3rd May 1797; Act 37, Geo. III, c.91, 22nd June 1797; Act 38, Geo. III, c.3,
30th November 1797; Act 42, Geo. III, c.40, 30th April 1802; Act 43, Geo. III, c.18, 28th February





























Bullion Bank of England Notes in Circulation
Figure 4: Bank of England Notes in Circulation and Bullion in the Bank of England
1794-1825, Quaterly. Gayer et al. (1953), Micro￿lm Appendix pp. 1296 and 1358.
after the suspension.36 Although between 1800 and 1801, as seen in Figure 5, the pound
depreciated on the Hamburg exchange, this was due to factors other than the Bank￿ s
credit expansion such as bad harvests and de￿ ation in Hamburg.
While the country was engaged in the war the Directors felt obliged to satisfy the ur-
gent wartime demand of the Treasury. The Bank bought Exchequer bills often at direct
requests by the Treasury brokers.37 This was very convenient for the Treasury if the
markets did not absorb as many Exchequer bills as the Treasury wished to dispose. The
strong responsibility of the Governors was not eased by the fact that the Bank￿ s public
advances were still subject to parliamentary control and it was technically prohibited
from buying Exchequer bills or making advances to the Treasury without Parliament￿ s
permission. During the time of war Parliament was not keen to enforce the law or limit
Treasury￿ s needs.38 Figure 6 shows the development of the public advances between
36Du⁄y (1982) p. 69.
37Clapham (1944) p. 62. Gayer et al. (1953) Micro￿lm appendix p. 1388.
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Figure 5: Price of Hamburg Bills on London, Monthly 1790-1825, shillings per pound.
Gayer et al. (1953), Micro￿lm appendix, p. 1465-1466.
1794 and 1825. During the ￿rst decade of the Suspension Period the level of advances
stays relatively low, the average of advances outstanding being about £13,500,000.
Figure 6 also includes all the assets of the Bank arising from its business with
private borrowers, and it shows how the private discounts in total grew faster after the
suspension compared with the public advances. However, during the ￿rst three years
the growth of the discounts is still moderate. Before the suspension the Bank￿ s note
issue had been about 10 to 11 millions but it started to rise after the suspension (Figure
4), probably explained by the issue of the notes of small face value.
If during the ￿rst ten years of suspension the Bank￿ s credit policy had been rela-
tively restrictive, the following years were quite the opposite. Political developments in
Europe and the increased sea-power of Britain opened new markets for British goods
both in Continental Europe and South America, which created a commercial boom in
England. As seen from Figure 4 the notes outstanding remained relatively stable from
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Figure 6: Bills and Notes Discounted and the Public Advances by the Bank of England,
Monthly, 1794-1825, thousands of pounds. Gayer et al. (1953), Micro￿lm appendix, pp.
1370-1371 and 1390-1391.
in 1810. Figure 4 only includes the Bank of England notes. Data on the circulation
of country bank notes is not available until 1804 and onwards when the law required
stamp duties to be paid on private notes. The value of all notes stamped in 1805
was £10,700,000. Private bank notes consisted of almost 40 percent of the total paper
money in circulation.39
The commercial boom was, however, short lived. The exchange rate depreciated
which was largely the result of domestic in￿ ation and increased export. Holland had
fallen to France and Wellington was yet to achieve victory. From late 1809 onwards
bankruptcies increased and summer 1810 saw the outbreak of several economic crises.
The currency disorder, both comparable depreciation of the Bank of England￿ s notes
compared with the Continental exchanges and the 12 percent premium on gold in 1810,
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Figure 7: Domestic and Foreign Price index. Source: Gayer et al. (1953) Micro￿lm
appendix.
received attention amongst the public and started a major debate labelled the bullion
controversy. It was not a a single issue controversy, but of wide range of problems that
had been brought forward by the inconvertible paper currency. Parliament appointed
a Bullion Committee, which was established to inquire into the high price of gold, so
as to ￿nd out whether the Bank had issued the right amount of money. Between Feb-
ruary and May 1810 the Bullion Committee had held 31 meetings and examined 29
witnesses, including the Directors of the Bank. ￿ Anti-bullionists￿ , the government but
also some merchants and bankers in London, were more supportive towards the real-bill
doctrine of the Directors of the Bank who insisted that they had not been over-issuing.
By discounting real notes which represent real transactions (￿ there are actual goods in
existence￿ 40) as opposite to ￿ speculative notes￿ , they were just serving the legitimate
needs of trade, they claimed.41 Supporters of the prompt return to convertibility were
40Thornton (1802) p. 85.
41Flandreau (2006) and Sargent and Wallace (1982).
21called ￿ bullionists￿and their arguments have been seen as an anticipation of the modern
quantity-theory of money. Although not being a member of the Select Committee on
the High Price of Bullion42, David Ricardo became the major expositor of the Bul-
lionist position. The conclusion of the Bullion Report was that the rise in the price
of bullion and the adverse exchanges had been caused solely by an over-issue of Bank
of England￿ s notes. The in￿ uence of the country bank issue was noted by saying that
the quantity of country bank paper dependent upon the quantity of Bank of England
paper, increasing and decreasing with it and by increasing its notes, the Bank made
more plentiful the reserves into which every country banker was required to redeem his
own notes.43 Finally, the report recommended a gradual return to specie convertibility.
Narrative historiograpy has accused the Bank of discounting irresponsibly or pur-
suing real bill policy by accepting all sound paper (non-speculative paper) without
considering ￿ its desirability in terms of national monetary policy￿ 44. The criticism,
especially on the Bank￿ s ignorance, is simplistic as it is based on either the Bullion
Committee￿ s report or the testimonies given by three Directors of the Bank in front
of the Bullion committee. These testimonies have been seen as evidence of the lack
of knowledge of any monetary theory in the Bank by a large group of historians. The
testimonies, however, do not tell the whole story of the Bank￿ s credit policy, as the com-
mittees interrogation was very intense and the directors gave answers that exaggerated
the extent of their anti-bullionism.45 These three rather personal statements, as often
stressed by the Directors themselves during the interviews46, presented the views of the
corresponding directors at that precise moment. Historiography has ignored the fact
that the opinions of two of these interviewed directors changed in the following year.
According to Du⁄y (1982) the Bank￿ s regulatory policy was rather ￿imprecise￿in
nature. The Bank￿ s internal Discount Committee in its own report of 1810 suggested
that the fault did not lie in the regulations but in their neglect by the Directors, who
42Cannan (1925) p. xlii.
43Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 61-66.
44Fetter (1965) p. 41.
45Du⁄y (1982).
46Cannan (1925) p. 33.
22received pressure from business and government. The Bank had sought to dampen
commercial optimism by limiting the expansion of credit, but the mechanism of setting
a maximum credit limit had broken down.47
Whether or not due to mismanagement, deliberate monetary expansion or bad har-
vests, the pound had depreciated and the general price level increased. How did the
increased money circulation, including that of the private banks, a⁄ect the real econ-
omy during the Bank Restriction Period? The answer depends largely on the ability of
the economy to respond to shocks, which in the nineteenth century was, at best, very
low.
Although the eighteenth century marked the start of liberalisation, the extent of the
advance in ￿ exibility during the Enlightenment is exaggerated. Hamilton (1940) argues
that ￿ it would be a great mistake to assume that natural liberty dethroned mercantilism
in practice before the ink dried on the Wealth of Nations￿ .48 Mercantilist institutions
such as a craft guild system had still an in￿ uence on commercial life and Elizabethan
laws on compulsory apprenticeship restricted the free movement of labour and wages.49
As systematic in￿ ation had not existed in previous centuries, rigidities had been visible
only when the harvests had been poor and prices and wages had failed to adjust.
In most sectors nominal money wages were ￿xed for a year so that changes in price
level had an immediate e⁄ect on real wages, not nominal wages. Rogers (1908) argues
that as the premium on gold increased by 30 percent, the nominal wages paid in paper
money would have been ￿ in reality little more than two-thirds of their reputed value￿ .50
The situation was probably not as grim for the majority of wage earners: In the ￿rst
half of the nineteenth century agriculture was by far the main employment followed by
domestic service51, that were sectors in which a part of wages were paid in food, drink
and accommodation so that the changes in the price level had a smaller impact on the
standards of living.
47Du⁄y (1982) pp. 80-81.
48Hamilton (1940) p. 305.
49The craft guilds were not legally extinguished until the Municipal Reform Bill of 1834.
50Rogers (1908) p. 425.
51Gayer et al. (1953) Micro￿lm appendix p. 1706.
23Economic historians have devoted a considerable amount of e⁄ort to analysing the
development of real wages during the Industrial Revolution. Recent econometric ac-
counts suggest, that real wages decreased in Britain as whole between 1755 and 181952.
There were huge regional variations and in places where technology was particularly
advanced, such as Manchester, both nominal and real wages might have risen 53. Gen-
erally, however, the nominal wages failed to increase at the same rate with prices. The
years between 1750 and 1820 have been called a period of ￿ prolonged wage stagnation￿ 54.
The question of how the change in the price level and in real wages a⁄ected produc-
tion has received less attention. A seminal although controversial study was conducted
by Hamilton (1942). He calls the lag of wages behind prices ￿ pro￿t in￿ ation￿and argues
that it was a powerful promoter of industrial growth as pro￿t in￿ ation enabled a much
more rapid rate of industrial growth than would have obtained under stable prices.
Since the price trend was upward for so many years during the Suspension Period,
there was some adjustment in sticky nominal wages. The adjustment was not, however,
equally distributed: the wages of a small number of skilled workers rose fastest and
the wages of the relatively large number of unskilled workers adjusted more slowly.
The wage payment patern of factory workers and free artisans varied too. For example
the cotton operative received weekly wage but the hand-loom waver was usually paid
according to how many yards of yarn he had waved. Average wages of cotton operatives
employed in factories and a traditional hand-loom wavers are shown below in Figure
8. The average weekly wage of the cotton operatives remains almost ￿xed between
1806 and 1823 but the average weekly earnings of the hand-loom waver increases from
1811 to1814 and then decreased until 1819. The contemporaries were aware of labour
market frictions and wage stickiness. In Wealth of Nations Adam Smith wrote about
the con￿ ict between the workers and the masters that arise from the wage - pro￿t
di⁄erence because ￿ masters are always and every where in a sort of stactic but constant
52Botham and Hunt (1987) p. 382.
53Hamilton (1942).
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Figure 8: Average wage of cotton operatives and hand-loom wavers 1806-1823, shillings
per week. Source: Gayer et al. (1953) Micro￿lm appendix p. 1587.
and uniform combination not to raise the wages of labour above their natural rate￿ .55
Henry Thornton recognised that an excessive issue of paper does increase prices of
goods, ￿ though not the price of labour￿ .56 As a result the workers may be forced ￿ to
consume fewer articles￿ .57 His sophisticated analysis was overshadowed by Ricardo,
who, on the contrary, assumed that the economy was relatively frictionless, with no
short run stickiness and with high capital and labour mobility. The reduction of of
parliamentary intervention to a minimum served the interest of workers.58 Authors
of Bullion Report recognised that the wages were sticky, but as moneyed men were
rather conserned about wage stickiness downwards. Another evil of the general excess
55Smith (1994) Ch.8, Of the Wages of Labour in paragraph I.8.13. Available online at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith.
56Thornton (1802) p. 239.
57Thornton (1802) p. 239.
58Gordon (1976) p. 25.
25of currency was that:
By far the most important portion of this e⁄ect appears to Your Com-
mittee to be that which is communicated to the wages of common country
labour, the rate of which, it is well known, adapts itself more slowly to the
changes which happen in the value of money than the price of any other
species of labour or commodity.59
Baring, one of the authors of Bullion Report, became a fearce critic of Ricardo￿ s
quatity theory, accusing Ricardo of treating the relationship of money and prices as if it
were ￿ a mechanical operation￿ .60 He warned about de￿ ation as the attempt to maintain
money wage levels would lead initially to unemployment and to social unrest in the
long run.61 Robert Peel defended the workers by arguing that ￿ the natural result of a
return to a metallic currency must be a diminuation in the pro￿ts of the master, and
an increase in those of the men￿ .62 It was acknowledged that the rigidities in the labour
market were a problem and a series of labour market reforms were carried out already
in 1814. The purpose of the legislation, such as the Combination Laws which prohibited
collective bargaining, was to ensure the ￿ exibility of labour markets downwards, but
not necessarily upwards.
While labour markets were gradually made more ￿ exible in the nineteenth century,
the price rigidities increased when the Corn Laws were imposed in 1815. The Corn
Laws were designed to stabilise the exchange rate ￿ uctuations caused by a large import
of wheat which depreciated the exchange rate, increased the out￿ ow of gold and could
have challenged the resumption. Another function of the Corn Laws was probably to
preserve the abnormally high pro￿ts of the Napoleonic war years for the landowners.
The Laws stated that no foreign corn could be imported into Britain until domestic
corn cost 80d. per quarter. The high price caused the cost of food to increase and
consequently depressed the domestic market for manufactured goods because people
spent a large part of their earnings on food rather than commodities.
59Cannan (1925) p.
60Gordon (1976) p. 106.
61Gordon (1976) p. 107.
62Gordon (1976) p. 149.
26The dangers of de￿ ation had been recognised by the authors of the Bullion Report
who recommended gradual adjustment to convertibility. The government was in no
rush to apply the recommendations and there was considerable delay before the subject
was even discussed in Parliament. As long as Napoleon was in power, the Bank had
little choice but to make advances that the government demanded. Although private
discounts fell, the note circulation kept increasing after 1811 due to large government
borrowing.As early as 1814 an act63 had been hurried through Parliament which stated
that ￿ although resumption was highly desirable￿ , it should be postponed until 5 July
1816. The policy of the resumption of cash payments got complicated by the inde￿nite
character of the ￿rst peace and the Hundred days reign of Napoleon.
After Waterloo on 18 June 1815 ￿ a larger ￿eld of discretion￿ was opened to the
Bank64. The start of the adjustment to the gold standard coincided with abolition
of the income tax, easing the de￿ ationary pressure on wage earners to some extent.
Although the discounts were still administered according to principles which had been
applied during the war, the decline of the discounts between 1815 and 1817 was mainly
a product of the fall in the market rate of interest below 5 percent in 1817, and the
Bank￿ s decision not to adjust its own rate accordingly. According to Clapham (1944),
the Directors of the Bank were inclined towards the view that the Bank in normal
times should not discount extensively because there would be other sources of ￿nance
available, but should be more active in discounting during di¢ cult times.65
The Bank and the Government were opposing any de￿nite resumption date and even
any investigation of the problem66. In 1816 the price of gold had fallen close to par
and the directors decided to experiment with the partial resumption of cash payments.
There was no internal demand for gold as, according to Fetter (1965), the public was
now so used to the notes and found them far more convenient than gold. Country
banks preferred notes since handling gold and silver involved transimission expenses.67
63Act 54, Geo. III, c.99, 18th July 1814.
64Fetter (1965) p. 76.
65Clapham (1944) Vol II, p. 62.
66Fetter (1965) p. 62.
67Pressnell (1956) p. 156.
27The demand of specie was, however, dependent on the market price of gold: In summer
1817, as can be seen in Figure 5, the exchange rate became unfavorable, and the market
price of gold rose. The newly coined gold went to France and caused the failure of the
partial return to convertibility. The failed experiment and the Bank￿ s simultaneous
e⁄ort to buy bullion, although at a loss, gave a strong message of the commitment of
the Bank to return to the gold standard in the near future.
In early 1819 the Parliament and the Bank adopted a plan of the gradual resump-
tion of cash payments. Parliamentary committees were established in both Houses to
inquire into the expediency of resuming cash payments, and their reports in 1819 were
practically identical. They recommended the resumption of gold payments at the old
par value on 1 May 1821. Ricardo￿ s idea was to resume payments through an ￿ ingot
exchange system￿that would have prevented small notes from being converted to gold.
The plan that got accepted, proposed adjusting the price of the gold gradually so that
on 1 February 1820 redemption was to be done in £4.1.0 per ounce and then gradually
reduced to the old par value on 1 May 1823, when all restrictions upon cash pay-
ments were to expire. Iit became, however, evident that the resumption would not be
possible without Parliament, who previously had not interfered with the government￿ s
borrowing or supported the Bank against the demands of the Treasury. In July 1819
an Act was passed in Parliament that made it illegal for the Bank to lend money to
the government for more than three months without the permission of the Parliament.
In order to reduce circulation and bring the gold to its par value of £3. 17s. 101
2d., a
substantial amount of the government￿ s short term debt to the Bank was paid back.
In 1818 the government tried ￿nally to introduce a bill limiting note issue of private
banks outside Scotland but it faced opposition from the banks and the government was
forced to withdraw it.68
During the last years of suspension the Bank of England was heavily criticised
by the public. Fetter writes that ￿ men who were far apart on most points were in
agreement that somebody was making too much money for the paper money system￿ .
The price of corn fell very low while agricultural rents, mortgages and other private
68Fetter (1965) pp. 67-69.
28loans remained at the same level. According to Feavearyear, some men who had been
most enthusiastic for a return to the gold standard began to have doubts about the
desirability of resumption. It was often the very same people who ￿rstly had accused
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Figure 9: Revised Index of Industial Production, 1700-1913 in Crafts et al. (1989).
Although in 1817 the partial resumption had resulted in a drain of gold from the
vaults of the Bank, following the Resumption plan of the Parliament did not cause
problems. Gold was almost at parity and on February 1, 1820, when the notes became
redeemable for gold at £4 1s. There was no demand and only a couple of ingots were
purchased ￿mainly for curiosity. The fact that the Bank note was legally redeemable
at a ￿xed price of gold seems to have meant little to the public.70 On 1 May 1821
cash payments were fully resumed and the monetary system of the country, was ￿rmly
69Feavearyear (1963) pp. 224-225.
70Fetter (1965) p.96.
29established.
The Suspension Period represented an enduring social commitment to monetary
stability in the form of a domestic institutional framework. The Bullion Committee￿ s
report had two e⁄ects on the way monetary policy was conducted: ￿rstly, it increased
awareness of in￿ ation and the policy of the Bank did not become too accommodating,
and, secondly, the adjustment to the gold standard become shorter and sharper than
would otherwise have happened. Between 1797 and 1821 the Bank of England notes
were always accepted at their face value. After Waterloo the markets seem to have
considered resumption very likely: the interest rate fell and gold came gradually back to
par. The suspension of cash payments was also considered credible abroad. Continental
merchant bankers anticipated the victory of Britain and a return to convertibility, and
built their credit in London during the war. In 1816 eight to nine percent of the British
national debt was held by foreigners living abroad.71 The national debt had grown from
£225,000,000 in 1785 to over £880,000,000 in 1821, more than 250 percent of national
income.
The Bank Restriction Period bound monetary and ￿scal policy issues together.
Maintaining domestic production and consumption were important because if they had
fallen at the beginning of the war, the ability to pay taxes would also have decreased.
Figure 9 shows, how apart from the depression caused by the de￿ ation in 1819, the
industrial production grew during the war. The Suspension Period was an era of al-
most continuous industrial growth when domestic production in England increased 68
percent.
4 The Well Established Gold Standard
The starting point for the formal analysis is an idealised set up that I call the well
established gold standard, thus the convertibility rule has been in force for a su¢ ciently
long time. I depart from the prevailing literature by considering an economy where
only paper money circulates as a medium of exchange and gold operates as a backing
71Neal (1990) p. 216.
30commodity if held by the central bank; or as a commodity good if held by the private
agents. The paper focus on a commodity standard rather than a commodity money
and therefore, specie does not circulate as a medium of exchange.
The economy consists of three sectors: households, ￿rms and a central bank. Since
households and ￿rms behave as atomistic competitors, I will restrict the discussion to
a representative agent of each type. The in￿nitely lived household consumes both gold
Kt and the consumption good Ct. There are two possible states of the world: peace
and war. The di⁄erence between the two states is that during the time of peace the
household receives a new gold endowment Ks
t at the beginning of period, but during the
time of war the endowment is zero. The probability of war is assumed to be considerably
smaller than the probability of peace, thus peace re￿ ects the normal state of the world.
Consider ￿rst the economy during the time of peace. Its random exogenous endow-
ment of new gold, Ks
t > 0, is normally distributed with a positive mean and variance
and measured in ounces. The household can choose what proportion of its gold endow-
ment is consumed, i.e. turned to jewelry. The rest is deposited at the central bank for
exchange of paper currency. The central bank follows the gold standard rule by being
prepared to buy or sell gold in exchange for paper currency with a ￿xed conversion rate
Q:
The non-monetary gold is not considered as a durable good, but rather as a per-
ishable good that fully depreciates in private use. This assumption, which partially
follows the model of the gold standard of Bordo, Dittmar and Gavin (2003), is chosen
purely to ensure the existence of gold demand in every period. If the gold were assumed
to depreciate in private use, as in Barro (1979), the household￿ s gold demand in each
period would be at least as high as the depreciated amount of gold. On the contrary,
the monetary gold which is kept in the vaults of the central bank, does not depreciate.
The money supply satis￿es Ricardo￿ s (1821) set up for convertible currency where









The gold reserve ratio ￿t 2 (0;1] de￿nes the proportion of the circulating paper money
31stock that is backed by monetary gold.
The net increase in the specie stock and monetary gold between periods t + 1 and









Equation (2) can be expressed in terms of the growth rates by rewriting it as
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t in (3) is repliced by (1), equation (3) becomes
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where the term on the right hand side represents the net increase in circulating money
stock proportional to monetary gold between period t and t + 1:
The representative ￿rm uses the labour Lt it hires from the household to produce
current output via its production technology f (Lt). Since the representative ￿rm does
not have access to the gold endowment, the ￿rm faces a cash constraint in that it starts
the period t without any cash or credit holdings and it has to borrow in order to be able
to pay for its workers. The current wage bill must be ￿nanced with a loan or discount
drawn on the central bank. The ￿rm sells the output to the household on demand for
consumption on a cash basis and after receiving its revenue, the ￿rm pays the principal
and the interest on its discount to the central bank. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995)
employ a similar set-up, but as suggested by the historical analysis, this framework is
a natural one to apply to the gold standard. In Carlstrom and Fuerst￿ s ￿at standard
set up at the beginning of each period the household deposits money at the ￿nancial
intermediary, who then in turn forwards the sum to the ￿rm. At the end of the period
the ￿rm repays the intermediary, who in turn forwards the interest and the original
deposit back to the household. In our set up the gold does not yield any interest at the
32central bank and the gold stays in the vault over the periods. By contrast to Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1995) the central bank is assumed to distroy the interest yield.
The discount is de￿ned by the value of existing monetary gold stock and the discre-
tionary monetary injection from the central bank to the ￿rm
WtLt ￿ QK
g
t+1 + (dt ￿ 1)xtM
s
t : (6)






where dt is a rate of money expansion from the central bank￿ s money injection. The
higher dt; the lower is the proportion of the circulating paper money stock that is backed
by gold. It is assumed that there are some ultimate bounds on the discretionary money




for all t = 0;1;:::; where ￿ x < ￿ d < 1: The upper bound of the
discretionary money growth rate ￿ d can be considered to be arbitrarily large ￿higher
than the upper bound of the money growth rate linked to monetary gold ￿ x:
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century private credit markets were restricted
by the usury laws which set the interest rates of di⁄erent private assets at arti￿cially
low levels. The discounts here are assumed to be at the ￿xed gross rate ￿ R ￿ 1: Given
that the household can only do its gold trading with the central bank at the beginning
of period t, it is feasible for the central bank to have zero gold reserves during the
period.
The ￿rm hires labour supplied by the household and the production takes place
during the goods exchange. The ￿rm takes its price from the market, its wage from
the contract and maximises pro￿ts. The household supplies what ever labour the ￿rm
demands. The pro￿t function of the ￿rm becomes
￿
f
t = PtYt ￿ ￿ RWtLt: (8)
The ￿rm￿ s production function is
Yt = f (Lt) = AL
￿
t (9)
33where A is the ￿xed stock of capital, Lt is labour demand at period t, 0 < ￿ < 1; and
therefore f (Lt) is a strictly concave function. In the equilibrium the real wage bill of





Now the nominal wage rigidities72 are introduced into the model by assuming that
wages are set in advance for one period, before the period￿ s gold endowment is realised.
Although the nominal wage is chosen before any shocks to the gold endowment are
known, they are set at a level that is expected to produce the real wage which equates
labour supply and labour demand and clears the goods market. To de￿ne the wage,
the notional labour supply is set at one although the actual labour supply and demand








where ￿ is the expected value of Pt before the gold endowment is known or the produc-
tion started. If (11) is substituted back into (10) and the functional form (9) is used,






























At the very beginning of the period when the nominal wage is set, the nominal wage
will re￿ ect expectations of the gold ￿ ow or any possible price level changes as a result
of the gold ￿ ow. Any unanticipated changes in the price level will cause a di⁄erence
between the expected and actual price level. The ￿rm determines labour demand based
72This part of the model is inspired by Canzoneri and Dellas (1998).
34on the real wage that is realised after the gold endowment. If the price level increases
unexpectedly, the real wage bill of the ￿rm decreases and the employment (12) increases
to clear the labour market.
From the household￿ s point of view each period is subdivided into two parts: the
exchange with the central bank and the exchange with the ￿rm. The household
trades bonds and gold with the central bank and labour and goods with the ￿rm.
The household sector enters period t with predetermined money Mt and receives its
gold endowment Ks
t: Now the household is in the position to do its gold trading with
the central bank: it chooses how much gold to consume and how much convert to
money. The gold trade with the central bank brings household￿ s money holdings to
Mt+(xt ￿ 1)￿tMt. Next the household￿ s bonds Bt mature, bringing its money holdings
to Mt+(xt ￿ 1)￿tMt+Bt: Finally, the household receives its labour income WtLt. The
household uses some of its cash to purchase new bonds costing the household Bt+1=It
in period t where It ￿ 1: The rest is transferred to the goods market. The household￿ s
consumption purchases are limited by the cash-in-advance constraint




In this version of cash-in-advance, labour income is assumed to be available for con-
sumption in the same period.
At the end of period t the household receives a cash dividend payment ￿
f
t from
the ￿rm and carries rest of the unspent currency into period t + 1. Hence the budget
constraint states
Mt+1 ￿ Mt + Bt + QK
s





￿ PtCt ￿ QKt: (16)
The nominal interest rate on bonds It is not ￿xed which illustrates the economic envi-
ronment under the Pre-classical Gold Standard where the government paper, such as
consols, were free from usury laws.
The nominal variables in the cash-in-advance constraint, budget constraint and on
the ￿rm￿ s problem are now normalised with the money supply (7) so that Ms
0 = 1;
mt = Mt=Ms
t ; wt = Wt=Ms
t ; q = Q=Ms
t ; bt = Bt=Ms
t and pt = Pt=Ms
t : In the ￿rm￿ s
35problem, equations (11)-(14), ￿ is denoted by !: The cash-in-advance and budget
constraints become





dtxtmt+1 ￿ mt + bt + qK
s





￿ ptCt ￿ qKt: (18)
Given Ks






t [u(Ct) + ￿v (Kt)], (19)
where 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ is the utility-of-gold weight and Et (￿) is the expectations operator,
subject to the normalised budget constraint (18) and cash-in-advance constraint (17)
taking pt; R; ￿
f
t and wt given for all t = 0;1;2:::. In addition, the private agent￿ s
problem must satisfy the market clearing conditions




M0 = 1 (22)
K
s




bt = bt+1 = 0 (24)
for all t = 0;1;2:::. The discretionary money growth rate can be de￿ned as inverse of





By writing the ￿rst term on the right hand side of (6), QK
g
t+1; as ￿t+1Mt+1 = ￿t+1xtdtMt
and substituting the equilibrium conditions (21)-(22) and (25), the wage constraint (6)
can be written in equilibrium as
WtLt ￿ (￿t + dt ￿ 1)xt (26)
36As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) there are four markets present in this economy:
the goods market, labour market, credit market and money market which in this gold
standard setup is synonymous with the gold market.
The outcome under the commodity standard describes the sequences of equilibrium
prices and quantities that are obtained when the government manages gold convertibil-
ity and sets the discretionary money growth rate and the private agents respond to the
stochastic, exogenous gold ￿ ow by maximising utility and pro￿ts. The Lagrangian for












t ￿ xtmt+1 + mt + bt ￿
dtxtbt+1
It









+￿t [(xt ￿ 1)mt ￿ q (K
s
t ￿ Kt)]: (28)
The ￿rst order conditions are
Ct : u
0 (Ct) = pt (￿t + ￿t) (29)
Kt : ￿v
0 (Kt) = q (￿t ￿ ￿t) (30)
mt+1 : dtxt￿t = ￿Et
￿













tEt￿1 (￿t + ￿t)mt = 0
where ￿t, ￿t and ￿t are the Lagrangian multipliers for the period t budget, cash-in-
advance and gold endowment constraints respectively. I assume that the government
does not purchase any goods. In equilibrium; (21) implies that mt = 1 and bt = bt+1 = 0.













37where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and 0 < ￿ < 1: By substituting the
market clearing conditions into the cash-in-advance constraint we have
ptCt = 1 ￿ ￿t + (2￿t + dt ￿ 1)xt: (34)
In equilibrium Yt = Ct; thus by substituting (13) into (34) the price level becomes
pt = (A)
￿￿1 !
￿ [1 ￿ ￿t + (2￿t + dt ￿ 1)x]
1￿￿ (35)
and by substituting this back to (34) yields
Ct = A
1￿￿!
￿￿ [1 ￿ ￿t + (2￿t + dt ￿ 1)x]
￿ : (36)
Equations (35) and (36) imply that both the price level and consumption increase if
either the money growth proportional to monetary gold xt or the discretionary money
growth rate dt increase above the rate used in contract wage setting at the previous
period. However, this does not apply in equilibrium. Intuitively, if at period t￿1 wage
setters￿expectation of the net money growth rate at next period is DeXe; but the
actual money growth rate is dtxt = DeXe + ￿t; where ￿t 2 (0;1); from (35) the
price level increases, which through (14) decreases real wages, through (12) increases
labour demand and through (36) increases consumption. Now the wage setters￿would
respond by adjusting their wage expectations to DeXe + ￿t, then the household and
government would have an incentive to set dt+1xt+1 to dt+1xt+1 = DeXe + ￿t+1 where
￿t < ￿t+1 < 1: The process would continue until xt+1 would approach its upper
bound ￿ x and dt would reach its upper bound ￿ d: Therefore, as in Barro and Gordon
(1983) the wage setters cannot be systematically surprised and in equilibrium money
growth would be une¢ ciently high without having any e⁄ect on real economy
If the money growth rate approaches its upper bound the household converts almost
its whole gold endowment to paper currency. Simultaneously, gold consumption ￿gold
in utility yielding form ￿approaches zero, which reduces current period utility while
the impact of gold conversion on consumption Ct is low as expectations have been
adjusted. This feature of the model is re￿ ected by the shadow marginal (dis)utility of
gold conversion ￿:
38The government￿ s time inconsisteny problem can be solved if the society is able to
make the government to commit to the prefect gold standard rule. This rule implies
that each note represents, fundamentally, a warehouse certi￿cate of a gold deposit as
in (1) ￿t = 1: Monetary expansion is directly dependent on the change in the monetary
gold stock (5) becomes
K
s




In the ￿rm￿ s problem the discount is never larger than the value of the monetary gold
stock and (6) implies that the discount does not exceed the circulating money stock.
Constraint can be rewritten using (1) where dt = 1 and (5) as WtLt = xtMs
t : Finally,
it should be noted that the gold standard rule is an exogenous monetary policy rule
and not an outcome of optimisation problem, an optimal policy under commitment,
in contrast to the Ramsey problem analysed by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland
(1997).
The perfect gold standard rule solves the government￿ s time inconsistency problem
by setting bounds on the growth of money. If the private gold demand is so large that
paper currency is converted to gold, the money stock reduces and xt < 1: On the other
hand if Kt approaches zero, from (5) we can see that xt approaches qKs
t +1: The private
gold demand ultimately de￿nes the gross rate of the monetary expansion
xt 2 [￿; qK
s
t + 1): (38)








Substituting (13) into (34) and setting ￿t = 1 and dt = 1 gives a relation between the

















The important element of the gold endowment is the way how it sets bounds on the
expectations of the price level. From (38) we have that if xt = ￿; the household
consumes its whole gold endowment and converts some paper money into gold at the





If xt approaches to (qKs + 1); the household only consumes an arbitrarily small amount











can de￿ne the bounds on private consumption by substituting the bounds on the money





How are the nominal and real interest rates de￿ned under the perfect gold standard
























If (41), (42) and the functional form of the utility function is substituted to (46), the











As 0 < ￿￿ < 1 the nominal interest rate increases when the money growth rate in
period t or the expected money growth rate increases. However, as the current and
the expected money growth rate are bounded under the well established gold standard,
40the ￿ uctuations in the nominal interest rate are also bounded. The nominal interest
rate reaches its lowest bound 1 if both the current and the expected money growth
rate are expected to be ￿. Depending on the size of ￿ and ￿ the nominal interest rate
approaches its highest bound if the money growth rate is expected to be high in the









where ’ is either 1 ￿ ￿￿ or ￿￿ depending on the relative sizes of ￿ and ￿:








































According to Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) the ex-ante real interest rate can be decom-










the risk free rate and the right hand side covariance term de￿nes the risk premium,
the expected return on bonds above the risk free rate. Under the gold standard prices
move pro-cyclically. The realised return on bonds is high in bad times when the gold
endowment is small and low in good times when the gold endowment is large. Positive











thus an increase in the expected gross growth rate of consumption, Ct+1=Ct increases














41thus expected future increase in money growth increases the risk free interest rate. The



















The real rate of interest increases if the money growth rate in period t increases or if
the expected increase in future money growth rate increases.
The interest rate risk under the gold standard is solely dependent on the risk related
to the stochastic nature of gold endowment. It is not related to government policies
or labour market conditions. Interest rate targeting or money stock targeting are not
feasible policies under the gold standard.
If the nominal wages are ￿xed in the economy money has an immediate e⁄ect on the
level of output. From equation (42) the positive gold endowment shock increases the
gold available for conversion. The money growth rate xt increases. Now the household
is able to increase its consumption purchases, which increases prices and decreases the
real wage below the expected level. The ￿rm￿ s wage bill reduces, which increases labour
demand and production.
The important outcome of the gold standard rule is the way how it solves the discre-
tionary problem which rises from the ￿xed wage structure. Although the gold standard
does not eliminate the link between money and output, it does prevent the government
from exploiting it by printing paper money unexpectedly. The gold standard rule makes
most monetary policy procedures, such as money targeting, dysfunctional. The role of
the central bank is passive in conducting the monetary policy, it simply facilitates the
convertibility and provides printing services.
Another outcome of the gold standard is that as the money growth rate x is bounded
through the gold endowment, also the price level and consumption become bounded.
Under the well established gold standard, market activity never disappears as the pri-
vate consumption is always positive even though the growth rate in money stock would
equal one. Nevertheless, the gold standard does not eliminate the variance of private
consumption, or the periods of disin￿ ation, but as xt ￿ ￿ (given that ￿ is close to one)
the economy does not experience serious de￿ ationary pressure.
42One could ask, however, what would happen if the endowment Ks
t would become
arbitrarily large. The answer is that in that case the monetary constitution would have
to adjust as gold would not ful￿ll the requirements for a suitable backing commodity
any more. Any commodity standard must be established on a commodity that is rare,
durable and easy to identify.
5 Abandonment of the Convertibility Rule
Suppose that a war or some other unexpected exogenous shock stops the gold ￿ ow
suddenly. The stoppage is realised only after the wages have been set. As wars are not
known to last forever the number of the stoppage periods must be ￿nite.
During the time of war the household￿ s demand for gold during the war, Kw
t ; in-
creases above its natural, peace time level. As Ks = 0; the household satis￿es its
gold demand by converting paper currency to gold at the central bank. To explain the
increased demand for gold we can imagine a situation where the war arises the ques-
tion of the central bank￿ s solvency in form of a potential invasion of the country. The
household, who has given its asset to the central bank, is concerned of the potential
downside outcome, where the gold stock of the central bank would end up in the hands
of enemies and therefore, the household has an incentive to consume at least some of
the gold stock. The central bank who holds the asset, considers the upside outcome ￿
the small likelihood of such an invasion ￿and is therefore concerned about de￿ ationary
pressure the bank runs can result.
The economy faces de￿ ationary pressure as a result of the conversion of the paper
money under the perfect gold standard. Firstly, as the stoppage is unexpected, the fall
in the price level is unexpected and the price level used in wage setting is now above
the actual price level. The real wage bill of the ￿rm (14) increases which forces it to
reduce employment and production. Secondly, any gold conversion reduces the reserves
on which the ￿rm can borrow. Thirdly, from the cash-in-advance constraint (34) a fall
in money holdings reduces private consumption.
Obeying the gold standard rule, which forces the government to convert money to
43gold on demand, would threaten the existence of the market activity. If rumours of an
invasion became so strong that the whole monetary gold stock would be consumed at
once, there would be no paper currency in circulation and consumption would approach
zero. But even in a less severe case where the gold ￿ ow would only stop for few periods
and the gold consumption would not drain the monetary gold reserves completely,
the de￿ ationary pressure can be avoided and consumption stabilised by altering the
monetary constitution of the country.
What would be alternative monetary regimes to the commodity standard? Firstly,
the government could abandon the commodity standard altogether and establish a ￿at
money system under which the money growth rate is a subject of the governmental
policy. Given that the stoppage lasts for a ￿nite time the outcome under the ￿at
standard as such is not desirable because in this sticky wage framework the government
has an obvious temptation to increase employment and production by increasing the
money growth rate. The behavior of the money stock and price level will be incorporated
into the expectations and the nominal wage set in the beginning of the periods will
adjust fully. Under the ￿at standard the money growth rate would be de￿ned by
Ms
t+1 = dtMs
t where the upper bound of discretionary money growth rate d would
be arbitrary large. As the realised return on bonds is inversely related to the price
level, in￿ ation would make the bonds harder to sell. Ireland (1997) has shown that
even though the government would be able to commit to a sustainable money growth
rate, any deviation from this would cause the economy to revert immediately to the
worst possible hyper-in￿ ation equilibrium. The ￿at money system, therefore, does
not necessarily o⁄er a solution for the desirable monetary regime in this particular
framework.
If the private agents only valued claims that can be converted to gold as money,
the ￿at regime would not be feasible and a commodity money system might emerge as
a monetary regime. The commodity money, however, might not be preferable because
the coins are likely to depreciate in use and coinage involves a cost, bassage.
Instead of abandoning the gold standard rule completely, the government, with a
simple action such as closing the doors of the central bank, could prevent the money
44stock decreasing by not allowing the household to convert any gold until the crisis has
passed. Suspension of the convertibility rule implies, ￿rstly, that paper notes are not
convertible to gold immediately and secondly, at some future point after the crisis has
passed, the gold standard will be resumed and the currency will be convertible at the
old par value Q: In e⁄ect, the value of the household￿ s paper currency is not tied by the
immediate conversion to the gold as under the gold standard, but by the commitment
to convert the currency in the future. If the household did not consider the promise to
be credible, the circulating paper currency would loose its value immediately.
Even if the stoppage on gold ￿ ow lasted for few periods, the suspension would not
necessarily cover only those periods. In fact, as illustrated by the historical example,
the suspension consists of two stages: stoppage and adjustment periods. During the
both stages the gold standard rule does not fully apply.
As the policy of the government and its central bank is countercyclical, its main
concern is to maintain private consumption and economic activity at the same level
as under the gold standard. The gold endowment under the gold standard ensured
bounds on the money growth which maintained the economic activity and positive real
interest rates. In the absence of the immediate gold backing rule, the government has
an opportunity to issue ￿at money to compensate for the loss in the gold endowment.
Under the suspension of cash payments it is not a formal conversion rule but a
terminal condition which restricts the government￿ s temptation to issue ￿at money. Let
t + T be the ￿nal period of gold standard and the ￿rst suspension period is t + T + 1:
To simplify the notation I write t + T = ￿ and ￿ + S > ￿ + 1 is the last suspension
period. The gold ￿ ow resumes in period ￿ +j < ￿ +S: If the gold standard is resumed




Equation (55) is e⁄ectively a terminal condition which states that the monetary gold
stock must be proportional to the circulating money stock by the time of the resumption.
The government is able to issue ￿at money during the suspension, but the money growth
rate must drop by the point of the redemption since the perfect gold standard rule
45does not allow any discontinuity. Withdrawing the ￿at money can cause de￿ ation and
disturb the economy as described above. On the other hand, if the policy is credible,
the markets are likely to anticipate the redemption.
The household enters the ￿rst suspension period with predetermined money M￿+1
inherited from the ￿nal period of the gold standard. The value of existing monetary
gold is still QK
g
￿+1 and proportional to the currency in circulation: Next the nominal
wage is set as in (11). After this, both the central bank and the private agents realise
that there is a complete stoppage in gold endowment. The government closes the doors
of the central bank and announces its policy plan (55). Then the household￿ s bonds
mature, it receives its labour income and uses some of its cash to purchase new bonds.
The rest is carried to the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint for the ￿rst
period of suspension is parallel to (15) where xt is set to one.




and i = 1;:::;j ￿ 1 and j ￿ 1 is the last stoppage period. The household￿ s budget
constraint in the absence of gold ￿ ow, reduces to









An important element of the suspension is the way how it does not just remove the
restriction on money market, but it also removes the restriction of the credit market.
The suspension abolishes the tie between discounts and monetary gold, namely (6).
The central bank is now able to increase the value of the discount above the value of
the monetary gold stock.
W￿+iL￿+i ￿ QK
g
￿+i + (d￿+i ￿ 1)M
s
￿+i; (58)
where d￿+i is a rate of money expansion from the central bank￿ s money injection. Under




￿+i+1 = d￿+iM￿+i; (59)









As the wage level is ￿xed for a period ￿de￿ned as under the gold standard ￿the unex-
pected discretionary injection increases employment and consumption. If the nominal
variables are scaled with (59) and the equilibrium condition
M￿+i = M
s
￿+i for all i (61)
used, equation (60) becomes
w￿+iL￿+i = ￿￿+i + d￿+i ￿ 1: (62)
The cash-in-advance constraint (56) can be written as
p￿+iC￿+i = 1 + w￿+iL￿+i (63)
or
p￿+iC￿+i = ￿￿+1 + d￿+i: (64)
The wage and production levels are de￿ned as in (11)-(14). By using the equilibrium













Both the price level and consumption increase as the discretionary monetary injection
d￿+i increases.
If the stoppage in gold ￿ ow lasts between periods ￿ +1 and ￿ +j ￿1, where j ￿ 1;
period ￿ + j is the period when the gold ￿ ow resumes and the adjustment back to the
gold standard starts. I assume that the gold ￿ ow returns to the pre-suspension level.
In the beginning of the ￿rst adjustment period the household receives its gold en-
dowment Ks
￿+j and makes the decision over the private gold consumption K￿+j: The
47rest is deposited at the central bank in same manner as during the gold standard. Given
that the doors of the bank stay closed for the notes-to-gold conversion, the willingness
of the household to deposit gold might not seem natural73. The historical evidence
shows, since the rule to return to the gold standard was credible, people were willing
to convert gold to paper currency during the Suspension Period.
The full resumption is not immediately achievable, because the circulating money
stock exceeds the value of monetary gold and the backing is not complete. Therefore,
in the adjustment periods the government can still conduct discretionary policy. The
return to the gold standard to be credible, instead of stimulating the economy with the
money transfer, the government must reduce the money stock so that the money stock
grows more slowly than the monetary gold.
The return of the gold endowment is realised before the government decides over
the discounts. By constraining the discounts the government is able to withdraw the
￿at money that it issued on the previous period. In nominalised form the wage bill
under the adjustment becomes
w￿+jL￿+j =
￿











The cash-in-advance constraint in adjustment period is
P￿+jC￿+j ￿ M￿+j + (x￿+j ￿ 1)￿￿+jM
s




If we now substitute (67) into normalised (69), and use the equilibrium condition bt+j =
bt+j+1 = 0; we get that
p￿+jC￿+j = 1 ￿ ￿￿+j +
￿
2￿￿+j + d￿+j ￿ 1
￿
x￿+j: (70)
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73During the suspension period the terminal condition must be included in the household￿ s decision
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where j = 1;:::;S. The price level and consumption in the adjustment period de-
pend both on the money growth rate x￿+j+1 linked to the gold endowment and the
discretionary money ￿ reduction￿rate d￿+j+1:
Under the perfect gold standard terminal condition (55) sets the limit for the money
growth rate. If (2) and (68) are substituted into (55) and the equation is solved back-

















where the suspension lasts between periods ￿ + 1 and ￿ + S. The terminal condition
implies that the net money growth rate under the Suspension Period must be propor-
tional to the growth rate of monetary gold under the suspension period. The money
growth rate from the gold ￿ ow is one in the stoppage periods and larger than one in
the adjustment periods. The discretionary money growth rate is larger than one in
stoppage periods and smaller than one during the adjustment periods. The net growth











d￿+i = 1; (75)
and where i = 1;:::S:
The government￿ s policy plan under the suspension period is to return to convert-
ibility at some future point. It is credible if it provides the government incentives not to
deviate even though the government would have an obvious time inconsistency problem.
This problem exists here as under the suspension period the government would now
have a temptation, given that the wages are ￿xed, to increase consumption by print-
ing ￿at money. The plan to return back to the gold standard limits the government￿ s
49printing because any ￿at money issued must also be pulled out from circulation which
is a process that is likely to cause de￿ ation and reduce consumption.
The suspension ensures the existence of the circulating money stock and stabilises
consumption. If the government￿ s objective is to keep private consumption at the level
of the gold standard, the government issues ￿at money during the stoppage and pulls
it out from the circulation during the adjustment periods. An opportunity to boost
consumption by the ￿at money issue is desirable as during a war economic activity is
likely to be low in any case. This is exactly what happened during the Suspension Pe-
riod. During the war years 1797-1815 the Bank of England created substantial amount
of credit, but when the gold trade resumed after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 and the
government was able to abolish the war time taxes, the credit market was constrained
and the circulating money stock reduced.
By contrast to the historical evidence, the model suggests that the adjustment period
does not necessarily result in de￿ ation if the net money growth rate x￿+id￿+i during
the adjustment periods is above one. Any potential de￿ ation under the adjustment,
nevertheless, lasts only for a limited time. As the de￿ ation reduces private consumption,
it is important that the adjustment occurs when the gold has already started to ￿ ow
into the country. The government could prevent de￿ ation if it just closed the doors of
the central bank but would not issue any ￿at money. The bene￿t of this strategy is
that it makes the adjustment period unnecessary and the length of the suspension is
parallel to the length of the stoppage in gold ￿ ow.
One further point is worth of noticing. In ￿at regime models such as Ireland (1997)
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), the government gives the monetary transfer directly
to the household. Under the commodity standard set up transfers are injected via ￿rms
and not households, because the latter practice would challenge the return back to the
gold standard: to reduce the circulating money stock to match the monetary gold stock
in the adjustment period, the government would have to reduce the monetary price of
gold Q which would encourage private gold consumption and reduce the paper money
available for consumption purchases.
Finally, how does the expected future resumption e⁄ect the interest rates? The ￿rst











where i = 1;:::;S: (76)
In stoppage period, the money growth rate x￿+i = 1 and the consumption is only
bound by the commitment of the government to the policy rule that there will be a
return to the gold standard. If we now use the CRRA utility function and use (72) and




















Any expected increase in either the future money growth rate x￿+i+1 or discretionary
money growth rate d￿+i+1 increases the nominal interest rate. On the other hand if
￿at money is expected to be withdrawn, any expected reduction in d￿+i+1 decreases
the nominal interest rate. The lower is the d￿+i+1; the higher is the rate by which the
issued ￿at money is withdrawn from the circulation and more closer the resumption
gets. Expected resumption thus decreases the nominal interest rate.


































where i = 1;:::;S￿1: The real interest rate increases if either x￿+i+1 or d￿+i+1 increases
and again, if the public expects the adjustment to last for many periods, the interest
rate is higher than it would be, if the adjustment was supposed to be short. The long
adjustment period suggests that the ￿at money is withdrawn gradually (d￿+j+1 close
to 1).
516 Calculations
To illustrate the implications of the suspension I analyse the behaviour of consumption,
monetary gold and money. Calibration proves challenging as reliable data on gold
import between 1717 and 1797 is not available. The circulation of Bank of England￿ s
depository notes grew in average 2.5 percent per year, but there were large ￿ uctuations
in the gold reserve ratio. In this simplistic example xt = 1:01 when Ks > 0 and 0:98
when Ks = 0: The discount factor ￿ = 0:99:
The prevailing monetary regime between periods 1 and 20 is the perfect gold stan-
dard. The monetary price of gold is one and the initial money stock and gold stock
equal 1.42. As the money growth rate is constant (and incorporated in wage setting)
consumption (and price level) are constant over time.
At period 41 there is a sudden stoppage on the gold ￿ ow. The ￿rst column of
diagrams in Figure 10 illustrates ￿ uctuations in monetary gold, the money stock and
consumption when the country does not suspend the gold standard, but follows the gold
convertibility rule through the stoppage periods. The money growth rate x = 0:98; thus
the money stock and gold stock reduce 2 percent per period. Consumption falls sharply
during the stoppage periods as the household converts its paper currency to gold, and
remains low until the gold endowment resumes at period 30. Respectively, the monetary
gold and money stock fall as the paper money is converted to gold After the gold ￿ ow
has resumed it takes 20 periods before monetary gold and the money stock are at the
pre-stoppage level.
The second column illustrates development of monetary gold, the money stock and
consumption when the gold standard rule is suspended. The number of stoppage periods
is ten as above. During the stoppage periods the discretionary money growth rate is
1 percent per period (d = 1:01) and equals the net money growth rate since x = 1:
As the household cannot convert its paper money to gold, the gold stock remains
constant during the stoppage. The discretionary money stock grows 1 percent per
period (d = 1:01). In period 30 the gold endowment resumes and the money growth
rate x proportional to monetary gold is again 1 percent per period. The adjustment to
52the gold standard begins as the discretionary money growth rate between periods 30
and 50 is now 0:995 implying that the net money growth rate is close to one, xtdt =
1:005. Given that wage expectations do not adjust fully, the consumption reduces
slightly. However, reduction in consumption occurs after the war, not during it, thus
the suspension of cash payments smooths consumption.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have used both historical and theoretical analysis to study changes in
monetary regimes and especially a transition from the gold standard to the suspension
of cash payments and vice versa. The results suggest that if there is a stoppage in
gold ￿ ow, the suspension of cash payments may be a preferable monetary regime to
the ￿at standard or to the gold standard in terms of stabilistation of consumption
and production. The monetary rule enforced by the suspension ￿to return to the gold
convertibility at the old par value in the future ￿represents a commitment device, which
limits the issue of paper money. As the rule implies that notes will be fully convertible
in the future, the suspension of cash payments ensures that paper money remains in
circulation.
The suspension of cash payments is divided in two stages. During the stoppage
periods, when there is no gold ￿ ow, the government prevents the household from con-
verting money to gold and stimulates economy with ￿at money transfers. The perfect
gold standard does not allow any discontinuity and by the time of resumption, the cir-
culating money stock must be proportional to monetary gold. To minimise de￿ ationary
pressure the adjustment begins when the gold ￿ ow resumes. During the adjustment pe-
riods any ￿at money issued is withdrawn from circulation. If the net money growth rate
under the adjustment periods is less than one, the adjustment causes some de￿ ation,
but only for limited time. If the net money growth rate during the adjustment is equal
or larger than one, the stoppage of gold endowment does not caused any de￿ ation.
The gold standard restricts the government￿ s ability to stimulate consumption and
production by printing money. Under the gold standard the money stock can only
53grow if monetary gold grows in the same proportion. As the gold endowment is ￿nite
the money growth is bounded and therefore, also the price level, consumption and
interest rates are bounded. Although the gold standard cannot remove the variability
in consumption as such, it provides a market driven mechanism to ensure the existence
of these bounds.
The conclusion about the desirability of suspension does not, at least in this particu-
lar framework, imply that the suspension would yield higher utility than the ￿at money
or the gold standard regime. The question of which regime maximises the welfare of
household remains open and as a topic of future research.
This paper has questioned whether the gold standard as a contingent rule theory
could be applied to the Pre-Classical Gold Standard of 1717-1797, and the Suspension
Period of 1797-1821. I identify the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments
as di⁄erent monetary regimes and argue that the cash payments were suspended only
because following the convertibility rule became unfeasible and the circulation of pa-
per money fell on a level, which did not maintain consumption and production. The
disadvantage of the gold standard is that it is subject to gold supply shocks as the
feasibility of the standard relies on availability of gold to monetary use. This was a
problem England had to face at the end of the eighteenth century.
The adjustment period during the suspension of cash payments from 1797 to 1821
was shorter and sharper than the one in the example. Figure 11 illustrates the Bank of
England￿ s public lending, discount business and notes in circulation from 1794 to 1825.
The Bank gradually increased its issue from the beginning of the Suspension Period in
1797 until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. After the war the government was
able to reduce its expenditure, cut income tax and tighten the credit market and money
supply. By the time of the resumption of the gold standard in 1821 only the public
advances remained above the pre-suspension level. The Suspension Period, nevertheless,
represented an enduring social commitment to monetary stability in the form of a
domestic institutional framework. Between 1797 and 1821 the Bank of England notes
were always accepted at their face value. After the Battle of Waterloo the markets
seem to have considered resumption very likely: the interest rate fell and gold came
54gradually back to par. The suspension of cash payments was also considered credible
abroad. Continental merchant bankers anticipated the victory of Britain and a return
to convertibility, and built their credit in London during the war. In 1816 eight to
nine percent of the British national debt was held by foreigners living abroad.74 The
national debt had grown from £225,000,000 in 1785 to over £880,000,000 in 1821, more
than 250 percent of national income.
If a form of paper standard, such as the suspension of cash payments, is preferable
monetary regime to the gold standard in terms of stabilisation, one can ask why the gold
standard was resumed at all in 1821. Why England did not adopt a standard where,
for example, the Bank Directors would have used their expertise to decide over money
issue? This option appealed to a large group of contemporaries. Some private bankers,
Birmingham manufacturers and even some Members of Parliament recommended that
the paper standard should become permanent monetary regime. They criticised de-
￿ ationary monetary policy of the Bank and suggested that at least pound should be
devaluated, i.e. the gold standard resumed in lower par value.75 The Bullionists, espe-
cially Ricardo, rejected these suggestions and the outcome of the Bullion Debates was
that rules won over discretion: the convertibility rule was seen, ultimately, as ￿ the invis-
ible hand of monetary policy￿ 76. It was the best available solution to the institutional
dilemma, which emerged from the role of the Bank of England as a private institution
that was able to make pro￿t from issuing notes and as a central bank which had wider
collective objectives such as price stability. It was recognised, that institutional changes
in banking system, for example, in the freedom of private banks to issue notes, were
required before the Bank￿ s commitment to the gold convertibility rule was sustainable
and it was able to operate as a true central bank.
74Neal (1990) p. 216.
75Fetter (1965) p. 99.
76Flandreau (2006).
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Figure 10: The monetary gold stock, money stock and consumption under the gold
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Figure 11: Public advances, private advances and the Bank of England notes in circu-
lation 1792-1825, thousands of pounds, quaterly. Source: Gayer et al. (1953), micro￿lm
appendix.
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